Factor models are frequently applied to hedge fund returns in an attempt to separate the return from identified risk factors (beta) and from manager skill (alpha). More recently, these same techniques have been used to replicate the returns from hedge fund strategies with varying degrees of success. In this paper, we show that due to the particular nature of hedge fund incentive contracts, the use of net of fee returns can lead to considerably biased estimates of factor exposures which can distort the picture of fund manager performance. The solution we propose is to model the gross returns of hedge funds and the incentive fees independently, which gives a truer representation of the underlying return generating process. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we quantify the effect of this bias on both performance attribution and replication. We find that using net of fee returns understates the return attributable to beta by up to 58 basis points per annum. Following from this we find that some of the additional beta exposure can be captured by basing replication on gross rather than net returns. We also investigate the risk taking behaviour of fund managers conditional upon the delta of their incentive option and find that contrary to previous studies, there does appear to be evidence of increased risk taking for those managers who find themselves significantly below their high water mark.
Introduction
Investors in hedge funds are generally charged an annual management fee that can range anywhere from 1% to 3% of assets under management, and also an incentive fee which is typically between 10% and 30% of annual profits, based upon the fund's overall performance.
It is argued that the annual management fee is designed to cover the fund's operating costs while the incentive fee "incentivizes" the manager to produce absolute returns. 1 This incentive fee is typically subject to two constraints: a "hurdle rate" and a "high-water mark".
The hurdle rate is a benchmark return that must be exceeded before the performance incentive fees are payable. In practice, this hurdle rate is often set at zero, although benchmarks such as LIBOR are also common. The high-water mark means that each investor only pays performance fees when the value of their investment is greater than its previous highest value, which ensures that an investor only pays an incentive fee for positive performance once any previous underperformance has been recouped. The existence of such incentive fees and high-watermark provisions means that hedge fund fees are both time-varying and pathdependent, and therefore that the relationship between gross and net of fee returns is nonlinear.
Figure 1 illustrates this via a Monte Carlo simulation of 5,000 funds over a 100 year history, assuming that the underlying gross returns are 1% per month with a 5% standard deviation (comparable to historical equity market returns). For funds that charge only an annual management fee (for example, mutual funds), the distribution is simply moved to the left by 0.17% per month with all other moments unchanged. However, introducing a 20% annual incentive fee that is accrued monthly and paid annually with a high-water mark provision, leads to a more significant change in the distribution. First, the mean net return is 0.70%, implying that the mean incentive fee payable is 0.13% per month, which is clearly less than 20% of the 0.83% return net of management fees because fees are only payable on positive returns above the high-water mark. Second, the standard deviation of net returns is 4.67%, which is lower than the 5% for gross returns. This is because the fees act to smooth returns over time. So if, for example, the returns net of management fees but before incentive fees for two consecutive months are +1% and -1%, the net returns will be +0.8% and -0.8%. Third, the net returns exhibit negative skew because incentive fees will be charged on positive but not on negative returns. Finally, net returns exhibit excess kurtosis since the incentive fees 1 Kahn, Scanlan and Siegel [2006] provide an extensive discussion and analysis of hedge fund fees.
have the impact of pushing the distribution away from the shoulders into the centre, and the standard deviation is lower. Performance attribution and the effect of incentive fees on the risk exposures of an investor
Most of the empirical work on the effect of market or risk factors on hedge fund returns builds upon the work of Sharpe [1992] . His framework for the analysis of mutual funds involved the development of an asset class factor model to determine risk exposures of the form:
where R t represents the return on the fund at time t, F i,t represents the return on factor F i at time t, β i,t represents the sensitivity of the fund to factor F i at time t and α is the value added by the manager.
Sharpe regressed mutual fund returns against twelve asset class returns and interpreted the resulting betas as representing the mutual funds' historic exposures to the asset classes.
Sharpe's results showed that only a limited number of major asset classes were required to successfully replicate the performance of the universe of U.S. mutual funds. Sharpe's model is the building block of most risk-return research in hedge funds. This approach was first used in the hedge fund arena by Fung and Hsieh [1997] , who applied Sharpe's asset class factor model to a sample of hedge funds and mutual funds using eight asset classes. The results were strikingly different for hedge funds compared to mutual funds: 47% of the mutual fund regressions had R-squared values higher than 75%, and 92% had R-squared figures higher than 50%. For the hedge fund regressions, 48% had R-squared values below 25%. Subsequent work by Fung and Hsieh and other authors has attempted to improve upon the explanatory power of the models using different sets of independent variables, sample periods and hedge fund databases. Most of this work has been conducted within Sharpe's general framework. Some have concentrated on the addition of non-linear factors such as options (Agarwal and Naik [2000] ) while others have estimated time-varying betas using either rolling window regressions (Fung and Hsieh [2004] ), or by using statistical techniques such as the Kalman filter (Gehin and Vaissie [2006] ). However, all of this work has been undertaken using net of fee returns and linear regression techniques, where the resulting betas are interpreted as representing the exposure of the investor to a specific source of systematic risk.
For mutual funds, the only difference between net and gross returns is the management fees that are a fixed percentage of the assets under management. As equation (2) illustrates, in this case the beta is the same for both the investor and the fund because the fees are independent of the fund return, and so the fees affect only the fund's alpha.
However, because hedge funds also charge incentive fees which are a fixed percentage of the profits above a certain threshold, the fees are not independent of the fund's return. For this reason, the beta of the fund and the beta of the investor can be different depending upon the performance of the fund, as shown by equation (3). 
If, for example, the fund charges a 20% incentive fee, then the boundary conditions are as follows:
i) when the fund is a long way below the high-water mark -all gains and losses from the fund will accrue to the investor with no incentive fees payable. ii) when the fund is a long way above the high-water mark -all gains will result in further incentive fees being payable and losses will result in a reduction in the fees.
ption IncentiveO δ will be close to 1, and hence the exposure of the investor will be 20% smaller than the exposure of the fund.
It is clear, then, that using net of fee returns to calculate betas will lead to biased estimates.
The correct approach would be to model the gross returns of the fund and incentive fees separately. The possible consequences of modelling net rather than gross incentive fees is best illustrated with a stylised example.
A stylised example of the problem: Beta Partners Suppose that a hypothetical hedge fund called "Beta Partners" was established in January 1975, and unbeknown to its investors, the fund simply invested 100% of its assets on a passive basis in the S&P 500 index. Beta Partners charges the standard 2% management fee, a 20% performance fee with a hurdle rate of 0% and a high-water mark provision.
Applying the approach suggested by Ibbotson and Chen [2006] to separate the sources of return into alpha, beta and costs (or fees) by a static linear regression of the net returns from Beta Partners against the S&P500 index yields a slope coefficient of 0.91 and an alpha estimate of -0.23% per month. This implies that over the 31 year period, the compound annual returns of Beta Partners comprise an alpha of -2.67%, a beta of 11.95% and fees of 4.32%.
However, in this stylized example we know that all of Beta Partners' returns are driven by beta and it is the incentive fees that distort the picture. The correct approach is to use the gross returns to calculate the alpha and beta estimates before subtracting the fees. This approach, as one would expect, yields an alpha estimate of zero and a slope coefficient of 1. Thus the compound annual returns comprise an alpha of 0%, a beta of 13.45% and fees of 4.03%.
Using returns net of fees understates both the alpha and beta components of the return of the fund. While it is clear that the investor does not receive all of these returns due to the fee structure, separating out the effect of fees from the fund returns gives the investor a far truer representation of the underlying return generating process of the fund and of the performance of the fund manager. If an investor were to follow the methodology of Fung and Hsieh [2004] in an attempt to analyse the exposure of Beta Partners to the S&P 500 using a 24-month rolling window regression on the net of fee returns, the results would be as shown in 05 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 BETA S&P500
Beta SP500 Using Net Returns
The rolling regression results show how the beta varies between a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0.82 over the sample period. On the basis of this information an investor might conclude that Beta Partners is varying its exposure to the market over time but by construction, the actual beta of the fund is 1.0 at all times. All of the variation in exposure is actually coming from the change in the delta of the incentive fee option.
We know that the beta of the investor can easily be calculated from equations (3) and (4) once we have identified the delta of the incentive option. In this example, the incentive option is simply a 1-month call option on the S&P 500 with a strike set at the current high-water mark, and thus the delta can easily be calculated using the Black-Scholes equation. Figure 3 shows how the beta of the investor evolves over time.
As one would expect, the investor's beta is always between 0.8 and 1. When the incentive option has zero delta, the investor and fund betas are the same. When the incentive option has a 100% delta, then the investor beta is 20% lower than that of the fund. The evolution of the investor's exposure is far less smooth using this procedure compared to using net returns; part of the reason for this is the re-setting of the high-water mark each January after incentive fees are paid. In fact, using net returns simply results in a moving average of the true investor beta. 05 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 BETA S&P500 Beta SP500 Using Net Returns Beta SP500 Using Gross Return + Incentive Option
Empirical Analysis of Net and Gross Hedge Fund Returns
We now propose a technique for recovering gross of fee hedge fund returns and apply this to individual hedge fund performance data. The hedge fund return data are extracted from the TASS live and graveyard databases from January 1994 through to December 2006. More specifically, we extract monthly Net Asset Values (NAV) for all hedge funds that are denominated in US Dollars, that report monthly and that have at least 37 data points. This criterion results in a total sample of 2,837 funds of which 1,433 are currently reporting and 1,404 are no longer reporting. We recognise that this data will be subject to the various biases described by Fung and Hsieh [2002] and others, namely survivorship, instant history and selection bias. We minimise survivorship bias by using both the live and graveyard databases, and by using data only from January 1994 when TASS began collecting data on graveyard funds. Instant history bias has been estimated by Fung and Hsieh at approximately 1.4% pa.
We estimate the size of the selection bias by comparing the return on the equally weighted return of our sample to the equally weighted return on all funds in the database. We estimate this to be 0.83%pa.
Using these NAVs we calculate monthly net and gross returns using the following procedure.
All hedge fund database providers (and indices) report monthly net, rather than gross, performance figures. However, all of these providers also report NAVs as well as net performance figures, and by using a number of realistic assumptions it is relatively straightforward to estimate gross returns from these NAV numbers. To do this, assumptions about the following issues are required:
i. Management fees are calculated and paid on a monthly basis ii. Incentive fees are accrued on a monthly basis, but are only paid at the end of the calendar year
iii. Unless specified otherwise, the fund applies a high-water mark provision iv.
The fund implements an 'Equalisation Credit /Contingent Redemption' approach to calculating the NAV 2 such that it is the same for all investors.
The net hedge fund return for period t is calculated using expression (5):
The gross return calculation is calculated as follows: at the end of each year, the accrued incentive fee is reset to zero and if necessary, the highwater mark moved upwards to reflect this.
By applying this technique to the data, we can construct equally weighted indices for the ten strategies reported in the TASS database as well as a broad index of all hedge funds in our sample. Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the net and gross returns in the sample. Clearly, by construction, the compound annual, gross returns are higher than the net returns with the difference between the two being the fees. For our sample, the average fee charged has been 5.15% p.a., ranging from 2.57% for dedicated short bias to 6.07% for managed futures. When examining the standard deviation of returns, the empirical results are in line with our earlier Monte Carlo simulation, and in all cases the gross returns exhibit higher annualised standard deviation than net returns with the average difference being 0.78%. For skewness, the empirical results are also as expected with an average increase of 0.14. With regard to kurtosis the results are much less clear cut, with increases for some strategies and decreases for others. Overall, however, there is a reduction in kurtosis of 0.21. The combination of all of this means that gross hedge fund returns look far more "normal" than net returns and in fact, contrary to Brooks and Kat [2002] , for our sample it would appear that on average hedge fund returns display positive skewness and do not exhibit significantly excess kurtosis.
The Statistical Properties of Net and Gross Returns

Performance Attribution
In order to attribute hedge fund returns between alpha, beta and fees, Ibbotson and Chen [2006] carry out regressions on net of fee hedge fund returns, using S&P 500 total returns (including both concurrent and with a one-month lag), U.S. Intermediate-term Government
Bond returns (including one-month lag), and cash (U.S. Treasury Bills) as benchmarks. They constrain all style weights to sum to one, but allow individual style weights to be negative or above one to account for shorting and leverage. Once they have calculated alphas, they deducted this from the net return to give the return from beta. Then, using the median management and incentive fee levels, they estimate what the fees on this total net return would have been to "gross it up".
We replicate Ibbotson and Chen's methodology using the net of fee returns for our sample of hedge funds and the following risk factors:
• the total return of the Wilshire 5000 composite index;
• the total return of Lehman US Aggregate Index; and
• one month USD LIBOR.
We then compare this to the results we obtain by calculating the gross return before performing the regressions. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 which are directly   comparable to Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 1 in Ibbotson and Chen [2006] .
By construction, the alpha estimate for gross returns will be larger by at least the management fees, although in all cases, the increase is much larger than this (the average increase being 4.51% p.a.). For our sample using gross returns, alpha is significant at the 5% level for all 10 strategies, whereas when using net returns it is only significant for 6 of them. For all strategies, the magnitude of beta for the risky assets (stocks and bonds) is greater and consequently the return attributable to beta is also larger (the average increase being 0.64% p.a.). This implies that although the major impact of fees is indeed on alpha, the effect on beta is not insignificant. 
Factor Model Specification and Replication
Using gross rather than net of fee returns when attempting to duplicate hedge fund performance via factor replication should produce better results for two main reasons. First, as we have already demonstrated, the use of net of fee returns for performance attribution leads to an underestimation of the return that is attributable to beta, and hence it follows that using gross returns in attempting to replicate hedge fund returns should produce better results by capturing this additional beta return. Second, the option-like nature of incentive fees creates a non-linear payoff to the factors which should be eliminated by using gross returns.
In order to assess the difference between replicated net and gross hedge fund returns, we employ a methodology similar to that of Hasanhodzica and Lo [2007] . However, whereas
Hasanhodzica and Lo and others have used the same small number of factors for every strategy, we start with a large set of 11 candidate factors and undertake a procedure to identify the significant factors for each strategy individually. This is because of the heterogeneous nature of hedge fund strategies and the advantage is that it avoids the use of superfluous factors in the regressions. Table 4 shows the set of 11 candidate factors. These factors were chosen because they provide a broad cross section of risk exposures which have all been identified in previous studies as significant. Importantly, all of the factors are investable via traditional funds, exchange traded funds or futures which is essential if they are to be used for replication. We classify the factors into two groups: those that require investment and those that are cash neutral. To ensure that when we construct clones and restrict the sum of betas to be equal to one, this restriction only applies to factors that require investment.
In order to identify the significant factors for each strategy, we first extract monthly returns for live and graveyard funds from the TASS database for January 1990 to December 1994 and construct equally weighted strategy indices. Although this sample will be severely affected by survivorship bias, because we are only looking to identify the factors that drive returns rather than making any judgements about performance, we feel that this is an acceptable approach.
Next we run regressions for all possible combinations of one to eleven factors, a total of 2 11 = 2,048 regressions, in order to identify the most parsimonious model, which we define as the one with the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The results are shown in Table 5 . The findings are in line with what one would expect. Equity based factors are identified as significant for those strategies that involve equities such as long/short equity, dedicated short bias and event driven. Bond or credit factors are identified as significant for fixed income strategies such as convertible arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage. The R-squared of the regressions ranges from 5.2% for managed futures to 76.17% for long/short equity, showing that factor models appear to perform much more satisfactorily for some strategies than for others. Having identified the factors that drive hedge fund returns for each individual strategy, we now attempt to construct linear clones using rolling window regressions. In addition to the factors identified above, we also introduce another factor, 1 month U.S. Dollar LIBOR, to allow for leverage. Using the factors identified above plus the LIBOR factor, for each individual hedge fund strategy we run a rolling window regression using a 24 month window from January 1995 to December 2006 as shown in equation (9) 
This leverage factor is then used to calculate the clone returns it R using equation (12) ( ) ( )
This procedure was repeated for the indices and individual funds using both net and gross returns, which results in a clone series running for 10 years from January 1997 to December 2006, the results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 . In all cases, the return on the gross clones is greater in magnitude than for the net clones (more negative for dedicated short bias) although the standard deviation of the return is also slightly higher. The average improvement in return for the gross clones over the net clones is 0.24% for indices and 0.36% for individual funds. The improvement in performance of the gross clones would appear to be proportional to the goodness of fit of the model. The biggest improvement is seen in strategies such as long/short equity and event driven where the Rsquared values of the regressions are high and the smallest improvement is for strategies such as equity market neutral and fixed income arbitrage where the R-squared is much lower. The correlation between the clone and fund returns is extremely high at over 85%, although there is no significant difference between the net and gross clones in either correlation or Rsquared.
The Effect of Incentive Fees on the Risk Taking Behaviour of Funds
We have already demonstrated how the payoff profile of hedge fund performance fees is identical to a call option on a percentage of the fund's performance. The rationale for this fee arrangement is to "incentivize" the hedge fund manager to produce absolute returns.
However, the reality is that the arrangement encourages managers to maximise the value of this fee option; their motivations could be different depending upon the delta of the option.
When the delta is high, the bulk of the value in the option comes from its moneyness and little from its volatility. But when the delta is low, the reverse is true. Authors such as Scanlan and Siegel [2006] have suggested that managers who are significantly below their high water mark might have an incentive to increase risk. This has been investigated for CTAs by Fung and Hsieh [1997a] and by Brown, Goetzmann, and Park [2001] , who both find little evidence of increased risk taking by managers below their high water mark. They hypothesise that career and reputation concerns as well as the increased risk of redemptions offset the adverse risk-taking incentives created by the incentive fee contract.
In order to investigate whether this is the case for the hedge funds in our sample, we examine the distribution of returns conditional upon the delta of the incentive option. Calculation of the exact delta of the fee option is problematic because we do not have an appropriate model or a true estimate of the implied volatility, so instead we use the "moneyness" of the option as a proxy for delta. Moneyness is defined as 
For our sample of 2,837 funds, we calculate the moneyness at each data point giving us a total of 229,101 observations. In order to investigate the relationship between the delta of the incentive option and the distribution of returns we divided the moneyness into 3 sub-samples:
-"At The Money" (ATM) where moneyness is greater than 95% and less than 105% -"In The Money" (ITM) where moneyness is greater or equal to 105%
-"Out Of The Money" (OTM) where moneyness is less than or equal to 95%
Using these sub-samples, we examine the properties of the distribution of gross returns at time t+1 conditional upon the moneyness at time t, the results are presented in Figure 4 . The three distributions appear to be very different. This is confirmed by the results of pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, and in all cases we can reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same. The standard deviation of the OTM sample is statistically larger than for either the ATM or the ITM samples, which appears to support the hypothesis that hedge funds increase their risk when they are below their high water mark. However, it also appears that ITM funds also increase their risk, so it might be that funds who are ATM actually reduce their risk.
Figure 4 The Effect of Incentive Fees on the Risk Taking Behaviour of Funds
Conclusions
We have demonstrated that estimating the factor exposures of hedge funds using net of fee returns will lead to biased results due to the non-linear impact of incentive fees. We have proposed an alternative procedure to estimate the exposures of the fund using gross returns and the effect of fees independently that is simple to implement. We have also illustrated, via a stylised example, that the proposed procedure will lead to far more accurate estimates of investor exposures when the return generation procedure is known. Using a large sample of hedge fund returns, we have shown that using net of fee returns understates the return attributable to beta by up to 58 basis points per annum. Following from this, we have demonstrated that some of this additional beta exposure can be captured by basing replication on gross rather than net returns. We have also investigated the risk taking behaviour of fund managers conditional upon the delta of their incentive option and found that contrary to previous studies, there does appear to be evidence of increased risk taking for those managers who find themselves significantly below their high water mark.
